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Imagine we are back in 1994 and Bakili Muluzi is President of the 
Republic of Malawi. In recent years criticism of the government has become 
common. The president makes a televised address to the nation to 
announce his proposal to repeal sections 50 and 60 of the Penal Code of 
Malawi (“the Code”), relevant provisions of the Protected Flags, Names and 
Emblems Act, and the Preservation of Public Security Act. He declares 
Malawi an open and democratic society and his intention to promote a 
culture of tolerance in Malawi. He further states that since governments and 
its institutions are far more likely to succeed if they subject leaders to 
critical scrutiny, he believes his proposal is the right thing for all Malawians 
who love freedom and democracy. What would have been the reaction to 
such a proposal? One can certainly imagine massive support from civil 
rights organizations and their allies. Editorial boards at leading newspapers 
would have written editorials praising this democratic move in Malawi. And 
leading academics would have supported this as a symbol of an open and 
democratic society. 
Of course, Muluzi never proposed such an audacious plan; yet this is 
precisely what is lacking in Malawi. This article reviews the application of 
laws against sedition in Southern Africa, with emphasis on Malawi’s 
application of these laws in the 1992 trial of Chakufwa Chihana. This 
analysis is placed within the context of a review of the development of 
sedition laws in Britain and the United States and a critical review of the 
Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal decision in Chihana v. Republic.1 The 
article revisits the Court’s opinion in Chihana to recommend that 
Parliament amend the relevant provisions of the sedition laws by providing a 
set of guidelines for courts to consider when determining what constitutes 
permissible restrictions of speech. It concludes that the establishment of a 
democratic order means, if anything, speech critical of government officials 
                                                 
1 MSCA Crim. App. No. 9 of (1992)(unreported) 
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and its policies should remain uninhibited, unless restriction is essential to 
prevent an incitement to imminent disorderly conduct.  
Section I discusses the early European developments of sedition law 
and how courts interpreted and applied them. Sections II looks at the 
development of sedition laws in American jurisprudence and highlights the 
United States Supreme Court’s struggle with the early cases. Section III 
reviews critically the Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal’s opinion in Chihana 
in light of similar court opinions in the Commonwealth, Europe and the 
United States. This review will focus on two central issues in Chihana: the 
first is the inclusion of ‘incitement to violence’ as a necessary element for 
sedition; the second is the court’s scrutiny of what constitutes permissive 
restrictions of speech in the context of the sedition analysis.  
THE GENESIS OF SEDITION LAWS AND EARLY APPLICATION  
The English Court of the Star Chamber invented the crime of sedition 
based on the theory that the King was above public criticism and that, 
therefore, statements critical of the government were prohibited. This was a 
novel and inventive means to silence government opponents.2 The crime 
was based on the hypothesis that those who did not share the government’s 
principles must consider its attempt to promulgate those principles as 
oppressive and to be defied. Therefore, ‘anyone who attempted to persuade 
others that the government’s methods were extremely erroneous must 
intend the expected consequences of his acts, which would be rebellion’.3  
The crime suggested that the utterance might in itself cause injury to the 
sovereign, thus, an assault on the dignity of the authority was judged to 
undermine his authority and to weaken the affection of his subjects in the 
same approach that libel or slander offended an individual’s reputation.4  
                                                 
2 See J. Burchell & J. Milton, Principles of Criminal Law, Cape Town, Juta & Co 
Ltd, 1st ed., (1991), pp. 616-617, (noting the historical use of the offence of 
sedition against government critics) 
3 14 T. Howell, A Collection of State Trials, London, T.C. Hansard for Longman, 
(1704), pp. 1095-1128 
4 See, E. Barendt, Freedom of Speech, Oxford, Clarendon Press, (1985), pp. 153.  
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Disapprobation of government principles had to be silenced because 
they intimidated appearances.5 Chief Justice Holt eloquently explained the 
need for the prohibition of seditious libel when he wrote in 1704 that: 
 
“To say that corrupt officers are appointed to administer 
affairs is certainly a reflection on the government. If people 
should not be called to account for possessing the people 
with an ill opinion of the government, no government can 
subsist. For it is necessary for all governments that people 
should have a good opinion of it.”6   
 
In view of the fact that the objective of the crime of sedition was to avoid the 
formulation of ill opinions of the government, truth was eliminated as a 
defence, if anything; true speech was perceived as worse than speculative 
speech since it had the potential to produce more harm to the reputation 
and appearance of the government.7 The ratio decidendi in the first sedition 
libel case in the Star Chamber in 1606 was that “seditious libel be it against 
the magistrate, or other public persons, is a greater offence, for it concerns 
not only the breach of the peace, but also the scandal of government”8 In 
this regard, Lord Coke pronounced that ‘it is not material whether the libel 
be true, or whether the party against whom it is made, be of good or ill 
fame.’9 The simple character of the words to weaken the authority of the 
government was a qualified basis for prosecution. This bond between 
government and society became chiefly responsible for the prevalence of 
                                                 
5 J. Koffer and B. Gershan, The Seditious Libel, 69 Cornell LR (1984), pp. 816. 
6 Rex v. Tutchin, 14, A Complete Collection of State Trials (1704), pp. 1096, 1128, 
quoted by Koffer and Gershman at pp. 822. 
7 Id. See also E. Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Gaithersburg. MD, Aspen 
Law & Business (2001), pp. 896. 
8 77 E,R. 251 (1606) 
9 Id. This sentiment was also eloquently echoed recently by then Chief Justice 
Banda in Chihana, supra note 1 when he noted “the appellant may well have 
felt honestly and sincerely that what he stated was true but the law says that is 
not a defense.” Id. 
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prosecutions of sedition in the eighteenth and nineteenth century 
England.10
Although disaffection was an issue at trial, it seldom presented a 
problem for the government or the court, as it could be without difficulty 
attributed to the defamatory content of the communication. The substance 
itself gave rise to an inference of contempt, which according to one 
commentator, was questioned only in proceedings which the judge thought 
the communication was unqualifiedly defamatory to infer contempt.11 The 
judge also had discretion to decide whether the substance was seditious. 
This was accomplished by reviewing the substance of a communication. 
Political prosecution focused on the “bad tendency” or derogatory inclination 
of the terminology in evidence. Since the basis for seditious libel 
incorporated the broad notion of shrinking the devotion of the people for the 
King and his government, judges actively determined what constituted libel 
without challenge.12
THE EARLY AMERICAN LEGISLATION 
       The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that: 
“Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or the 
press.”13 On its face, the First Amendment unquestionably was motivated 
by the censorship of speech that existed in English society.14 Professor 
Zacharia Chaffee has remarked that the First Amendment was intended to 
‘remove the common law of sedition, and make further prosecutions for 
                                                 
10 Barendt, supra note 4 at 153. 
11 P. Hamburger, “The Development of the Law of Seditious Libel and the 
Control of the Press,” 37 Stanford. LR (1985), pp. 661, 705. 
12 Id. at pp. 702 
13 U.S. Const. Amend. I. 
14 See, Chemerinsky, supra note 7 at pp. 895 (stating that until 1694 there was 
a system of licensing in England where no publication was permitted without a 
government issued license) 
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criticism of the government, without any incitement to wrongdoing, 
impossible in American society’.15  
Despite this understanding, speech critical of the government or its 
officials remained seditious and punishable in America after the adoption of 
the Constitution in 1789.16 In fact, many of those who framed and approved 
the American Constitution participated in the adoption of the Alien and 
Sedition Act of 1798.17 This law punished the communication of “false, 
scandalous, and malicious writing or writings against the government of the 
United States, with intent to defame; or bring them into contempt or 
disrepute; or to incite against them hatred of the good people of the United 
States, or to stir up sedition within the United States, or to excite any 
unlawful combinations therein, for opposing or resting any law of the United 
States, or any act of the President of the United States.”18  
The distinguishing factor of this law from the English experience is 
that the American law permitted truth as a defence and required proof of 
malicious intent. Fortunately for the government, the United States 
Supreme Court was never presented with an occasion to decide the 
constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Act until it was repealed following 
the election in 1800.19 Prior to being repealed, the Federalist had used the 
law against its opponents the Republicans.20   
                                                 
15 For a historical discussion of the First Amendment see, Z. Chaffee, Free 
Speech in the United States, Harvard University Press, 2nd ed., (1941), pp. 21. 
16 Professor Smolla stating that “ one can keep going round and round on the 
original meaning of the First Amendment, but no clear, consistent vision of 
what the framers meant by freedom of speech will ever emerge.” R. Smolla, 
Smolla and Nimmer on Freedom of Speech, New York, Clark Boardman 
Callahan, 3rd ed., (1996), pp. 1-18. 
17Alien and Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat 596, Act of July 14, 1798.  
18 Id. See also D. Pember, Mass Media Law, Madison WI, W.C. Brown & 
Benchmark, 6th ed., (1996), pp. 64. 
19 Pub L No 150, HR 8753 (16 May 1918) See also, New York Times v. Sullivan, 
376 US 254, 276 (1964)(declared that “although the Sedition Act was never 
tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court 
of history”) 
20 ‘When Thomas Jefferson took office as President in 1801, he considered the 
Sedition Act null and void and pardoned every person prosecuted under it; 
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         A review of historical literature teaches that sedition in America has 
mainly involved situations of armed conflict. For instance, following the 
American involvement in World War I, there was significant criticism of the 
draft.21 Some commentators put the number of draft dodgers to nearly 350, 
000.22 In response to these developments, Congress swiftly enacted the 
Espionage Act of 1917 which, in part, made it an offence when the nation 
was at war for any person wilfully to “make or convey false reports or false 
statements with intent to interfere” with the military success or “to promote 
the success of its enemies.”23 This legislation also made it an offence to 
wilfully “obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States.”24 
Under this legislation, convictions could be punishable by prison terms of 
up to twenty years (20) and penalties of up to $10,000.  
In 1918, Congress amended the Espionage Act of 1917 by its adoption 
of yet a more restrictive Sedition Act of 1918. This new legislation prohibited 
individuals from saying anything with the intent to obstruct the sale of war 
bonds; to “utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or 
abusive language” calculated to cause hatred or scorn for the form of 
government of the United States, the Constitution or the flag; or utter any 
words supporting the cause of any country at war with the United States or 
                                                                                                                                                 
while Congress used its spending powers to reimburse anyone fined under the 
Sedition Act and expressed its own views about the unconstitutionality of the 
Act.’ See, L. Fisher and N. Devins, Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law, West 
Publishing, (1992), pp. 11, 16-17, citing T. Jefferson, 11 The Writings of Thomas 
Jefferson, A. Bergh ed., (1904), pp. 43-44, 50-51 and H.R. Rep. No. 86, 26th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1804); For a discussion of the cases prosecuted under the 
Sedition Act, see A. Lewis, Freedom of Speech and Incitement Against 
Democracy, in Freedom of Speech and Incitement Against Democracy (D. 
Kretzmer and F. Hazan, eds. The Hague, Kluwer International, 2000), pp. 3. 
21 See, Z. Chaffee, Free Speech in the United States, Harvard University Press, 
2nd ed., (1941), pp. 108-111; D. Rabban, “The First Amendment in its Forgotten 
Years,” 90 Yale. LJ (1981), pp. 514, 581-582. 
22 See, R. Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America from 1870 to 
Present, Boston, KG Hall, (1978), pp. 105. 
23 Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. I§ 3, 40 Stat. 219. 
24 Id.  
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opposing the cause of the United States.25 The leading cases decided under 
the Sedition Act were Schenck v. United States26 and Abrams v. United 
States.27 In each of these cases, the Supreme Court upheld the convictions 
and the constitutionality of the both laws and their application to speech.28  
The case of Schenck v. United States involved the distribution of 
pamphlets which urged resistance to the draft during the First World War. 
The defendants in Schenck were charged under the Espionage Act of 1917 
that they conspired to “cause and attempted to cause insubordination in the 
military and naval forces of the United States, and obstruct the recruiting 
and enlistment service of the United States.”29 The written material at issue 
in that case said “do not submit to intimidation” but restricted itself to 
peaceful means such as a petition for the repeal of the Act. On a separate 
side, it had a heading “Assert Your Rights.” It explained that any one who 
denied ‘your right to assert your opposition to the draft” violated your 
constitutional right.30 It further described the ‘arguments from the 
government as coming from shrewd politicians and a mercenary capitalist 
press.’31  
           On the other hand, the case of Abrams concerned the distribution of 
pamphlets against America’s decision to send troops to Russia to fight 
                                                 
25 Act of May 16, 1918, 40 Stat. 553. 
26 249 US 47 (1919) 
27 250 US 616 (1919) 
28 In addition to these rulings, there were notable rulings by lower federal courts 
concerning the Acts. For instance, in Shaffer v. United States, 255 F. 886 (9th 
Cir. 1919), the court upheld the application of the Espionage Act of 1917 
against a book critical of American involvement in World War I. It was said in 
Shaffer that the test is “whether the natural and probable tendency and effect of 
the publication are such as are calculated to produce the result condemned by 
statute.” Also, in Masses Publishing Co v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y, 1917) 
rev’d 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917), Judge Learned Hand attempted to draw a clear 
distinction between incitement and discussion. He said that one “may not 
counsel or advise others to violate law as it stands. Words are not only the keys 
of persuasion, but are triggers of action.” For a thorough review of these cases, 
see generally Chaffee, supra note 21. 





against the Communists. The five defendants in Abrams were all Russian 
immigrants. They were charged with and convicted of four counts of 
conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917 as amended by the Sedition 
Act of 1918. The first three counts charged the defendants with conspiring, 
when the United States was at war with the Imperial Government of 
Germany, to unlawfully utter, print, write and publish: In the first count, 
“disloyal language about the form of government of the United States;” in 
the second count, language ‘intended to bring the form of government of the 
United States into contempt;” and in the third count, language “intended to 
incite, provoke and encourage resistance to the United States in said war.” 
The charge in the fourth count was that the defendant conspired “when the 
United States was at war with Imperial German Government, unlawfully, by 
publication to urge, incite and advocate curtailment of production of things 
and products, to wit, ammunition, necessary to the prosecution of the 
war.”32
            The first of the two leaflets at issue in Abrams said that the 
“President’s cowardly silence about the intervention in Russia revealed the 
hypocrisy of the plutocratic gang in Washington.”33 It called on workers to 
“awake against the true enemy of the world, capitalism.” The second leaflet 
directed its attention to Russian immigrant worker in the ammunition 
factories and said “you are producing bullets, bayonets, cannon to murder 
not only Germans, but also your dearest, best, who are in Russia fighting 
for freedom.”34 In his majority opinion in Schenck and his dissent in 
Abrams, Justice Wendell Homes announced the popular test of “clear and 
present danger” to establish the existence of seditious libel. Writing in his 
dissent in Abrams, Holmes explained: 
  
                                                 
32 Abrams, 250, US at 617 
33 Id. 
34 Id. Abrams, (Holmes, J., dissenting opinion) at 625-626 
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“I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts 
to check the expression of opinions that we loath and believe 
to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten 
immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purpose 
of the law that an immediate check is required to save the 
country.”35
 
Based on this test, speech is seditious when there is a ‘clear and present 
danger’ of unlawful action. Accordingly, Holmes declared in Schenck that: 
 
“the character of every act depends upon the circumstances 
in which it is done. The question in every case is whether the 
words used, are used in such circumstances and are of such 
a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they 
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right 
to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.”36
 
The striking relevance of the ‘clear and present danger’ test was its obvious 
abandonment of the focus on ‘bad tendency’ or derogatory inclination in the 
earlier English cases. This new approach went far beyond simple words and 
their derogatory inclinations. It emphasized on the observation of substance 
and probable outcome of the behaviour.37
 
RECENT AMERICAN LEGISLATION 
(a) The Smith Act and Era of Dennis 
         The most recent sedition legislation in the United States is the Smith 
Act of 1939. The Smith Act provides in pertinent part as follows: “Sec. 2. (a) 
It shall be unlawful for any person (1) to knowingly or wilfully advocate, 
                                                 
35 Id at 630 
36 Schenck, 249 US at 48. 
37 For an elaboration of this test, See, Whitney v. California, 274 US 357, 376-
378 (1927)(Brandeis, J., concurring)(held that “the necessity which is essential 
to a valid restriction does not exist unless speech would produce, or is intended 
to produce, a clear and imminent danger of some substantive evil fear of serious 
injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. To justify 
suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious 
evil will result if free speech is practiced.”) 
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abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of 
overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or 
violence, or by assignation of any officer of any such government.”38 The 
principal case prosecuted under the Smith Act is Dennis v. United States39 
Dennis involved the prosecution of the twelve governing members of the 
Communist Party of the United States. The indictment charged the 
defendants with wilfully and knowingly conspiring (1) to organize the 
Communist Party of the United States of America a society, group and 
assembly of persons who teach and advocate the overthrow and destruction 
of the Government of the United States by force and violence, and (2) 
knowingly and wilfully to advocate and teach the duty and necessity of 
overthrowing and destroying the Government of the United States by force 
and violence.40  
In affirming the convictions, the Supreme Court reasoned that there is 
a difference between advocacy and discussion of violence against the 
government. The Dennis Court explained that the Smith Act is directed at 
advocacy not discussion. The Court understood discussion as any peaceful 
communication of ideas such as the studies of Marx or Lenin in 
universities, while advocacy as the communication used to urge, plan, or set 
in motion unlawful acts against the government.  
         Whereas the Court professed to use the ‘clear and present danger’ 
test, it construed it in a new light. In clarifying this test, Chief Justice 
Vinson explained that: 
 
 “[the] words cannot mean that before the Government may 
act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be executed. 
The plans have been laid and the signal is awaited if 
Government is aware that a group aiming at its overthrow is 
attempting to indoctrinate its members and commit them to 
a course whereby they will strike when the leaders feel the 
                                                 
38 See, Dennis v. United States, 34 US 494 (1951) 
39 Id. 
40 Id at 497 
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circumstances permit, action by the Government is required. 
Certainly an attempt to overthrow the Government by force, 
even though doomed from the outset because of inadequate 
members or power of the revolutionists, is a sufficient evil for 
Congress to prevent.”41
 
In the years following the Dennis ruling, the Supreme Court decided 
several cases under the Smith Act. In Yates v. United States42, the Court 
reversed the convictions of several individuals for conspiracy to violate the 
Smith Act.  The Court declined to follow the Dennis approach and 
underscored that there was a fundamental “distinction between advocacy of 
abstract doctrine and advocacy directed at promoting unlawful 
action.”43The Court did not undermine Dennis, but distinguished it.  
According to Justice Harlan, who wrote for the majority, Dennis held 
that “the indoctrination of a group in preparation for future violent action, 
as well as exhortation to immediate action is not constitutionally protected 
when the group is of sufficient size and cohesiveness, is sufficiently oriented 
towards action, and other circumstances are such as reasonably to justify 
the apprehension that action will occur.”44 The Court found this was not 
present in Yates. It held that people are free to talk about the suitability of 
using violence to overthrow the government and may even express the 
desire to have the government overthrown by violence because the Smith 
Act does not prohibit the advocacy and teaching of a mere abstract doctrine 
of forcible overthrow of the government. 
 Justice Harlan further explained that the ‘distinction is that those to 
whom the advocacy is addressed must be urged to do something, now or in 
the future, rather than merely to believe in something.”45 Under the Yates 
test, the defendant must have advocated concrete action aimed at violent 
                                                 
41 Id. at 509 
42 354 US 298 (1957) 
43 Id at 318-321 
44 Id at 321 
45 Id. at 324-5 
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overthrow of the government. Advocacy of violence in the abstract is not 
sufficient.  The Yates Court emphasized the intention of the advocates, not 
the likelihood of their success. The problem with Yates is determining 
whether speech is advocacy of doctrine or advocacy of action. However, the 
superiority of the Yates decision is its elimination of the requirement of 
imminence, which led to greater protection of speech. 
(b) The Smith Act and Era of Brandenburg 
        Towards the mid 1960s, the highest American Court appeared to be 
more protective of freedom of speech.46 The main case supportive of this 
development is Brandenburg v. Ohio.47 In Brandenburg a Ku Klux Klansman 
from Ohio, was convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute for 
“advocating violence as a means of accomplishing political reform”48 The 
defendant was fined $1,000 and sentenced to one to 10 years’ 
imprisonment. On appeal, the Supreme Court struck down the Ohio law on 
constitutional grounds.49 The Court explained that the constitutional 
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a state to forbid or 
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of violation of law unless it incites 
“imminent lawless action”50 The Court considerably modified Justice 
                                                 
46 See, Bond v. Floyd, 385 US 116 (1966)(held that the Georgia legislature could 
not refuse to seat Julian bond because of his support for a statement strongly 
critical of the Vietnam War and the draft. The Court invoked the Yates test and 
concluded that Bond’s statements were advocacy of ideas protected by the First 
Amendment); Watts v. United States, 394 US 705 (1969), the Court reversed the 
conviction of an individual for violating the law that made it a crime to: 
knowingly and willfully threaten to take the life of or inflict bodily harm upon 
the President.” Watts was convicted under this law for saying “if they ever make 
me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sight is L.B.J. They are not 
going to make me kill my black brothers.” The Court stated that the Watts’ 
statement was “political hyperbole,” not a real threat, and therefore was 
protected under the First Amendment. 
47 395 US 444 (1969) 
48 Id at 445 
49 Id., See also, H. A Linde, ““Clear and Present Danger” Reexamined: 
Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto,” 22 Stanford LR (970), pp.1163. 
50 Brandenburg, 395 US at 447 
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Holme’s ‘clear and present danger’ approach.  Justice Douglas in his 
concurring opinion criticized the ‘clear and present danger’ test as follows: 
 
 “First, the threats were often loud but always puny and 
made serious only by judges so wedded to the status quo 
that critical analysis made them nervous. Second, the test 
was so twisted and perverted in Dennis as to make the trial 
of those teachers of Marxism an all out political trial which 
was part and parcel of the cold war that has eroded 
substantial parts of the First Amendment.51
 
In Brandenburg, the Court effectively broadened the scope of the First 
Amendment protection by concluding that a mere ‘abstract teaching of the 
moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to violence’ is not 
seditious. Therefore, a conviction for incitement under Brandenburg is 
constitutional only if several requirements are met namely: imminent harm, 
a likelihood of producing illegal action, and an intent to cause imminent 
illegality.52 None of the earlier tests had contained an intent requirement. 
Furthermore, Brandenburg underscored the significance of the pre-
eminence of danger in determining sedition, an approach which is protective 
of freedom of speech and gave greatest protection to the most recalcitrant 
speech. While the decisions by the United States Supreme Court have often 
been cited in many court decisions throughout Southern Africa, there are 
certain opinions that these courts are unwilling to adhere. 
SEDITION IN MALAWI 
(a) Sedition under the Malawi Penal Code 
          Sedition in Malawi is probably one of the highest political crimes. A 
majority of cases against individuals charged and convicted under the 
                                                 
51 Id at 454. The clear and present danger test relied upon the judge’s subjective 
interpretation. The intention of the accused was determined through decoding 
and construction and revealing the innuendo behind the words used. 
52 Brandenburg, supra note 48; For an analysis of the Brandenburg test see, L. 
Alexander, Incitement and Freedom of Speech, in Freedom of Speech and 
Incitement Against Democracy (D. Kretmer and F. Hazan, eds. Kluwer 
International, 2000), pp. 105-114. 
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nation’s sedition legislation have often drawn in political considerations.53 
This was also publicly acknowledged in 1993 by then United States Vice 
President Al Gore when he commented, in connection to the arrest and 
continued detention of political dissident Chakufwa Tom Chihana, that “I 
believe the [sedition] charges against him were politically inspired.”54 
Sedition is criminalized under the Code. Section 50 of the Code provides 
that:  
 
“(1) A seditious intention is an intention:  
 (a) to bring into hatred or contempt or excite disaffection 
 against the person of the President or the Government; or  
 (b) to excite the subjects of the President to procure the 
 alteration, otherwise than by lawful means, of any other 
 matter in the Republic; or 
 (c) to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection 
 against the administration of justice in the Republic; or  
 (d) to raise discontent or disaffection amongst the subjects 
 of the President; or 
 (e) to promote feeling of ill-will and hostility between 
 different classes of the population of the Republic.”55
 
The leading case determined under section 50 of the Code is Chihana 
v. Republic.56 Chihana involved the importation and physical possession of 
seditious publications by the Appellant, Chakufwa Chihana. Chihana had 
been charged with and convicted of two counts of seditious intent. The first 
count charged Chihana with importing seditious publications in 
                                                 
53 Chipembere v. Regina 1961 R. & N. 865 (F.S.C.); Banda v. Regina, 1961 R. & 
N. 844 (F.S.C.); Chihana, supra note 1; See, also the arrest and charge of Rev. 
Aaron Longwe in 1992 for sedition after addressing a meeting in Northern 
Capital City of Mzuzu in the run-up to the 1993 national referendum. 
54 Office of the United States Vice President, Press Release 14 April, 1993. 




contravention of Section 51(1)(d) of the Code, and second count of being in 
possession of seditious publication without lawful explanation in breach of 
section 51(2) of the Code.57 The trial court sentenced Chihana to eighteen 
months on the first count and twenty four months on the second count.  
In upholding the constitutionality of both the sedition law and 
convictions, the Supreme Court of Appeal explained that “the right of every 
citizen of the Republic of Malawi to have a candid, full and free discussion 
on any matter of public interest may be subject to restrictions and 
limitations”.58 In addition, the Court declared and accepted that the United 
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights was part of the law of 
Malawi and that the freedoms contained in that declaration must be 
respected and can be enforced in national courts. 
 The Court reviewed several foreign cases, including those from 
America and Europe that recognized restrictions and limitations on speech. 
However, without any specific reference to American case law, the Court 
concluded that limitations and restrictions on speech are of universal 
application.59 Banda expressly dismissed the absolutist view of freedom of 
speech. The Chief Justice then focused on what was described as the main 
issue on appeal, that is to say, whether the law of sedition in Malawi 
requires an element of incitement to violence before a conviction can be 
qualified?  
Chihana’s indictment was founded wholly upon a document titled 
“Prospects for Democracy in Malawi.” The document said that “the president 
and his government are the worst dictatorship in the whole continent of 
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58 See, Section 2(2) of the Constitution of Malawi provided that “Nothing 
contained in or under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent 
with or in contravention of subsection (1) to the extent that the law in question 
is reasonably required in the interests of defense, public safety, public order or 
the national economy.” 
59 A specific reference to the American case law would have at least included 
such recent sedition cases like the Brandenburg, supra note 47, NAACP v. 




Africa” The Justices concluded that these words were intended to arouse 
feelings of hatred, contempt or disaffection against the president and his 
government.60 The document also asserted that “the country, including the 
Armed Forces and the Civil Service, have been slaves under a dictatorship 
for 30 years,” and the Justices concluded that these words were intended to 
inflame or incite feelings of hatred, contempt and disloyalty or disaffection 
among the people and members of the Armed forces and the Civil Service 
against the president.61 The Court explained in conclusion that these 
statements could ‘not have been intended as constructive advice or 
criticism, rather were deliberately couched in order to achieve the desired 
effect’.62  
No argument seems necessary to show that these pronouncements 
were in no way calculated or intended to produce hatred again the President 
and his Government. Nevertheless, the statements were crucial to Chihana’s 
conviction. They were not only used to prove that Chihana had intended to 
arouse feelings of ‘hatred, contempt or disaffection’ against the President of 
Malawi and his government, but also to prove that Chihana intended to 
achieve the desired effect of his speech. Chihana, according to the Court, 
“had crossed the line between political criticism and insult.”63  
It seems too plain to be denied that there is greater than lawful 
restrictions on speech if a Court has to infer sedition from the words used. 
In other words, if a judge cannot deduce seditious intent from express 
words, inference of seditious intent would seem to violate the constitutional 
protections on speech unless an element of ‘imminent disorderly conduct’ is 
present. The Chihana Court admitted that except by inference, Chihana’s 
statements were not on the face of it seditious. His statement expressly 
called for a “peaceful change”, in opposition to violent change. How then 
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could such a statement be reasonably calculated to incite hatred or ill will? 
Moreover, there was no evidence of an outbreak of violence in the aftermath 
of Chihana’s importation of the statement.  
Furthermore, his statement did not expressly or implicitly call for 
violence, refer to any illegal organization, promote any disorderly conduct, 
or call the people into any specific action calculated to bring the President 
or his Government into contempt. The only reasonable conclusion is that 
Chihana spoke on matters of public concern because no opposition existed 
in Parliament at that time to offer alternative advice towards national 
government policy. As a result of this abnormal situation, Chihana was 
within his constitutional rights to exercise his duty of criticism outside 
Parliament in the manner that he did. Regarding speech critical of the 
government, Lord Bridge of Harwich has explained that: 
 
“In a free democratic society it is almost too obvious to need 
stating that those who hold office in government and who are 
responsible for public administration must always be open to 
criticism. Any attempt to stifle or fetter such criticism 
amounts to political censorship of the most insidious and 
objectionable kind. At the same time it is no less obvious 
that the very purpose of criticism levelled at those who have 
the conduct of public affairs by their political opponents is to 
undermine public confidence in their stewardship and to 
persuade the electorate that their opponents would make a 
better job of it than those presently holding office.”64
 
It was conceivable then for the Chihana Court to agree with the prosecution 
because Malawi was a one party state, which suggests that there was an 
operative ban on Chihana or any other person criticizing the government, 
even for purposes of suggesting an alternative governmental policy. 
Moreover, Chihana’s speech could be reasonably construed as 
appealing to the government to address the political and economic concerns 
                                                 




of the people. This ability to criticize and offer alternative suggestions to the 
government is undeniably crucial to effective running of government, 
because it is through criticism that people can influence their government’s 
choice of policies and public officials held accountable to pave the way for 
their replacement.65 Therefore, criticism of the government and its officers is 
the pinnacle to freedom of speech. In fact, it seems that democracy would 
demand that any political speech should be protected. Lord Bridge seems to 
agree with this view when he said ‘political officers must always be open to 
criticism.’66
The danger of the approach taken by the Chihana Court is that 
judicial recourse to hidden meanings within a speech renders impossible 
any objective examination of the government’s case against dissidents. This 
also raises even more acutely the problem of intent of the judge. Through 
inference, the Chihana Court politically appropriated the statements of 
Chihana and attributed to them a purpose, in this case seditious. 
Considering that one could not have reasonably determined the intent of the 
words used in Chihana’s speech, it would have made the most legal and 
democratic sense to examine the likelihood of the allegedly perceived effects 
of his speech. Such examination should have inquired into whether 
Chihana’s intention had an imminence of causing harm to the president or 
his government. Otherwise, anyone may be convicted for publishing or 
importing a statement critical of the government. 
Under current law, a statement that “the government of Malawi has 
the worst human rights record in the world” could be interpreted as 
seditious by a zealous prosecutor, because, arguably, one cannot expect 
people living under the worst human rights conditions to be loyal or render 
their continued allegiance to their president or government, but defy against 
such government. The Court in Chihana was unclear whether the law 
                                                 
65 See, A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government, New 
York, Harper & Brothers, 1st ed., (1948), pp. 27. 
66 Leonard Hector, supra note 64. 
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prohibited the statement or its likely effects. If the latter rings true then it 
would be appropriate to include the element of ‘incitement to imminent 
disorderly conduct.’67 This element would require a court to, among other 
things, consider the likely effects of any statement alleged to be seditious as 
a means of balancing between protection of speech and permissible 
restriction of speech. Even assuming the law did prohibit only the 
statements notwithstanding its effects, the foregoing requirements would 
still apply for similar reasons. 
Historically sedition laws in Malawi (then Nyasaland) have been less 
than protective of freedom speech. The case of Chipembere v. Regina68 is 
worth mentioning at this point because of its instructions on how courts 
may determine seditious intent. There, the appellant, Chipembere was 
convicted of two counts of sedition. These convictions arose out of two 
political speeches made by Chipembere to large audiences in 1960 at 
Rumphi and Zomba, respectively. In the first count, Chipembere was 
convicted of expressing seditious words, contrary to section 57(1) of the 
Nyasaland Penal Code. In the second count, he was convicted for expressing 
seditious words, and of ‘advocating’ violence, counter to section of 93(1)(a) of 
the said code. The Federal Supreme Court upheld the convictions.  
         In considering a statute corresponding to the statute in Chihana, 
Justice Clayden explained that ‘the crime of expressing seditious words has 
                                                 
67 It was argued by the defense that incitement to violence was a necessary 
element in the offenses of sedition under English Common Law and that since 
Section 3 of the Malawi Penal Code requires that the provision of the code be 
construed in accordance with the principles of English Common Law, the law of 
sedition in Malawi should be construed consistently with evolving notions of 
English Common Law. This argument was rejected on the basis that English 
Common Law is irrelevant where you have a legislative definition of seditious 
intent.’ Chihana, supra note 1; See also, United States Department of State, 
Malawi Human Rights Practices, (1993)(reporting that in November 1993 
Parliament amended the sedition laws to include "intent to incite violence" as a 
necessary element of seditious intent) available www.state.gov (accessed on 19 
November 2005). 
68 Chipembere, supra note 53. 
  
 22
to be measured with section 56 which included a definition of seditious 
intention.’69 It was said in Chipembere that in ‘determining whether the 
intention with which any words were spoken was or was not seditious, every 
person shall be deemed to intend the consequences which would naturally 
follow from his conduct at the time and under the circumstances which he 
conducted himself.”70         
Reading this case in light of Chihana’s statement it follows that a 
demand to inquire into the incitement of violence is proper and 
indispensable. For the reason that the natural circumstances of Chihana’s 
conduct-the call for peaceful and democratic change- can only be reasonably 
understood to result in peaceful change. In addition, the court should have 
considered the consequence of calling for a peaceful change of government 
by Chihana. Suppose in his speech, he had called for a violent change of 
government in stead of a peaceful one. This difference in the wording of his 
speech makes all the difference. If the court had given the words in his 
speech their ordinary meaning, it would have found that the ordinary 
meaning for calling a peaceful change of government means the speaker is 
opposed to violence and believes not in the use of force to topple a 
government. This is contrary to a speaker who for instance calls on the 
“people to arm themselves with firearms” to violently overthrow the 
government.  
If Chihana’s statements or actions were aimed at the overthrow of the 
government, (as construed by the court) then it could be said that his 
actions were nothing but a feeble and obtuse attempt to usurp power. It is 
irrational for anyone to think that any reasonable Malawian believed that 
Dr. Banda was worse than Mengistu of Ethiopia or Id Amin Dada of Uganda 
as alleged by Chihana. A contrary finding in the circumstances of his case 
would require an incitement of violence, which was not present in Chihana. 
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70 Id, cited also in R v. Sekhonyana, 1998 5 BCLR 640 (Les). 
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The conclusion in Chihana, thus, was as a matter of law inconsistent with 
the seditious jurisprudence in Chipembere and the earlier cases.71  
 It is undeniable that the challenge faced by the Chihana Court of 
drawing the line between freedom of speech and restriction on speech is not 
unique to Southern Africa. In R v. Sekhonyana,72 the Lesotho High Court 
was faced with a similar challenge. There, the defendant was convicted of 
sedition under section 4(1)(b) of the Sedition Proclamation No. 44 of 1938 
(Lesotho). The latter statutory provision is similar to Section 50 (1)(A)(b) of 
the Code. Section 3(1) of the Proclamation also defines seditious intent in 
similar terms to the Code. The accused in this case was a politician who had 
previously held various ministerial positions in the previous government of 
Lesotho.73 He was a member of a political party that had no representation 
in Parliament.74  
The statement in question was made on 13 November, 1993 during a 
political rally. The statement said that “members of the National Party 
should get firearms to protect themselves from the Lesotho Liberation Army 
(LLA)” which he alleged, was being “trained in the Republic of South Africa 
to replace the armed forces.” It accused the government of “secretly plotting 
against the people.” It also called on people “to arm themselves with 
firearms and ready to protect themselves from the LLA.” The statement 
challenged the members of the armed forces, asking whether “they want to 
wait until the situation in Lesotho deteriorating to the level of Somalia,” and 
suggested that if “the armed forces were afraid of the LLA, the members of 
his party would die fighting.”75
The High Court, concluded that the ‘accused had a seditious intent in 
terms of section 3(1) (i), (ii) and (iv) of the proclamation. The words which 
the Court was interpreting in this case were “to bring into hatred or to excite 
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disaffection against the person of Her Majesty as by law established”76 
similar to those used in section 50(1)(a) of the Code. The High Court held in 
this case that the “accused was not merely pointing out errors or defects in 
Government or Constitution of Lesotho as by law established or in 
legislation with a view to remedying such errors or  defects.” What he was 
doing “was to bring into hatred or contempt or incite disaffection against the 
Government of Lesotho as by law established.”  
 A common feature in the Chihana and Sekhonyana decisions is their 
reluctance to clarify the status of the common law offence of sedition. In 
both cases, an appeal was made to the court to apply the principles of 
common law in the determination of what constitutes a seditious offence. In 
Chihana, for instance counsel for the Appellant submitted that ‘incitement 
to violence was a necessary element in the offence of sedition under English 
common law and that since section 3 of the Code requires that its 
provisions be interpreted in accordance with the principles of legal 
interpretation obtaining in England, the law of sedition in Malawi should be 
read consistent with the evolving principles of English common law.77 The 
Court dismissed this submission and held that “we can only refer to the 
rules of construction obtaining in England when there is no express 
provision and where the words of the section being interpreted create a 
difficulty, an absurdity or an ambiguity;” that “it is not necessary to look to 
principles of English Common law in order for us to know what hatred, 
contempt or disaffection means because those words must be given their 
ordinary meaning.”  
Similarly, one of the issues that was submitted to the Court in 
Sekhonyana was whether in view of the enactment of the Proclamation at 
issue in this case, the common law offence of sedition continued to exist. 
The Court worded the question as follows: did the legislature intend to 
amend the common law in such a way that the common law offence of 
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sedition was abolished? The Court brushed aside the issue and explained 
that ‘it was now necessary [for the Court] to make a decision on this issue 
since the Proclamation clearly defined a seditious intention from which one 
can easily establish what “seditious words” are.’78It further stated that, 
should the need to define sedition arise, the Court would resort to the 
English dictionaries as well as to the common law definition of sedition.79 
Recently, the Lesotho Court of Appeal echoed this need to redefine the 
common law definition of sedition in Manyau v. R80 According to the Court, 
this is needed “because the common law must comply with the Constitution 
of Lesotho as its supreme law.”81 The Court went to say that “the common 
law actus reus for sedition as it applies in Lesotho since the adoption of the 
Constitution must be approached with care.”82 Such an approach according 
to the Court means that “certain [authorities] in South Africa, to the extent 
that they suggest that acts falling short of subversion and defiance and 
which amount only to a challenge to authority or protest against its 
exercise, constitute sedition.”83 Nevertheless, the higher courts in both 
countries implicitly sustained the common law offence of sedition without 
explicitly saying so. 
The Sekhonyana and Chihana cases actualize the difficulty faced by 
Southern African courts in freedom of speech jurisprudence. On the one 
hand, courts have to protect the right of individuals to speak on matters of 
public concern, and on the other preserve the integrity of the government. 
After all, courts are part of the political process notwithstanding that they 
are supposed to remain neutral on matters of politics. It is not an 
exaggeration to say that courts often tend to aid in advancing the political 
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wishes of the day. The foregoing cases exemplify this phenomenon in the 
Southern African context.84
(b) The Test for Reasonable Restriction on Speech 
From the standard point of a strict constructionist, perhaps a 
provision like the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects all ideas. However, with the exception of Justices Hugo Black and 
Douglas, this view has never commanded a majority of the Supreme Court 
of the United States.85 Similarly, in Malawi the Supreme Court of Appeal, 
through Chief Justice Banda, expressly declared that “it is wrong to 
describe or treat the right to freedom of speech as absolute.”86 Most jurists 
would concur that no matter how appealing the unrestrained view for 
freedom of speech, it is plainly unsustainable. There are several reasonable 
grounds from which the government must be able to punish certain kinds 
speech such as lying under oath. The issue often is what constitutes 
reasonable government restrictions on speech.  
In considering this issue, the Chihana Court considered several 
European cases, including Castells v. Spain,87 brought under Article 10(2) of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, for the proposition that 
limitations and restrictions on speech were universally applicable. There, in 
concluding that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention, 
the Commission reasoned that freedom of expression was not unrestrained. 
                                                 
84 Compare the American cases of Schenck, supra note 26, Abrams, supra note 
27 and Dennis, supra note 39 and others. 
85 New York Times Company, 403 US at 713; Justice Hugo Black and Douglas 
are the only known members of the Court who took the absolutist view of the 
First Amendment. See, H. Black, “The Bill of Rights,” 35 NYUL Rev (1960), pp. 
865, 874-879, (stating the phrase “Congress shall make no law,” is composed of 
plain words, easily understood. The language is absolute; that the framers did 
this balancing when the wrote the First Amendment… thus courts have neither 
the right nor the power to make a different judgment) See also, B. Woodward & 
S. Armstrong, The Brethren, New York, Avon Books, (1979), pp. 194-195, 
(stating that “since Black’s departure, Douglas was the only First Amendment 
absolutist on the Court.”)  
86 Chihana, supra note 1 
87 14 EHER 445 (1991) 
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However, it underscored that in “a democratic society, freedom of expression 
is an essential element for the formulation of political opinion” that “it 
follows from this that criticism levelled at government should find an answer 
in the forum of counter arguments.”88  
The Commission further gave details that “the government of a 
democratic State is able to avail itself for this purpose of a wide range of 
means to respond to unjustified attacks or criticism directed at the 
government by the opposition: [namely] statements by the appropriate 
minister before Parliament, the holding of a press conference, use of the 
right of reply, publication of an official announcement, etc” In the 
circumstance of Chihana, the authorities in Malawi did not use any of these 
available means to answer the so-called serious accusations brought 
against the government by Chihana, nor did the Court opinion scrutinize 
the government’s actions in this regard.  
A more recent case decided under article 10 of the European 
Convention is instructive for our purposes on the kind of restrictions that 
maybe considered reasonable in a democratic society. Ceylan v. Turkey,89 
decided in 1999, involved a Turkish citizen and labour activist Mr. Ceylan. 
Ceylan was charged under Article 312(2) and (3) of the Turkish Criminal 
Code and found guilty by the National Security Court. The Court sentenced 
him to one year and eight months imprisonment, plus a fine of 100, 000 
Turkish liras. After his appeal by the Court of Cassation was dismissed, 
Ceylan brought his suit to the European Court of Human Rights. The Court 
set aside the conviction and explained that freedom of speech as set out in 
Article 10 was subject to exceptions, ‘which must however, be construed 
strictly, and the need for any such restrictions established compellingly.’ 
Judge Wildhaber, who wrote for the majority, declared that ‘there is little 
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scope under Article 10 of the Convention for restrictions on political speech 
or on matters of public concerns.90  
Reading the Court opinion in the Ceylan case in light of the Chihana 
case, it would seem apparent that European Court has not recognized 
restrictions on speech where the speech expresses ideas in relatively 
moderate terms not associating with recourse to violence or inciting the 
population to use illegal means. In this regard developments in English law, 
in interaction with the standards set by the European Court in its 
interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, are 
particularly interesting.  
The European Court teaches that freedom of expression comprises the 
right to engage in open discussion of difficult problems, such as those facing 
Malawi in the years leading up to 1992, in order to analyze the root causes 
of a situation or to express opinions on possible solutions. It is clear 
therefore that at least in European terms Chihana’s conviction constituted a 
form of censorship which is inconsistent with the demands of a democratic 
society. Similarly, it is unquestionable that the Malawi Supreme Court of 
Appeal selectively misapplied both European and American case law 
because a proper application of the cases from both said jurisdictions would 
have commanded a different outcome. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF CHIHANA V. REPUBLIC 
Although Chihana was wrongly convicted, his guilt or innocence is not 
the only important question in this case. Chihana certainly did not say more 
than his counterparts in the American Communist Party cases discussed 
above. He did import and possess a statement calling on people to stand up 
against President Banda and his government. What he did was more than 
express his opinion. He was calling on others to act. Nothing had to be 
decoded by reviewing the innuendo behind the words used by Chihana, for 
his intention was express. However, it should be plain from the American 
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Reports 1996-V, p. 157, para. 58 
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and European cases that the Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal would have 
had difficulty in finding support from these jurisdictions in convicting 
Chihana had they chosen to seek it there.  
But suppose we strip Chihana of its Malawian context. Imagine 
Chihana as a Marxist revolutionary in the 1950s fighting for the overthrow 
of capitalism. He makes a statement and publishes it as he did in 1992. He 
is caught by American authorities. Where all this is true, he would probably 
have received a long prison sentence and upheld by the United States 
Supreme Court. What makes his case unique and his conviction erroneous 
in the Malawi context is the fact that Chihana was advocating what most 
people generally desired-- change. Communists in America and their 
proposals were extremely unpopular, disliked by both the public and 
government. They were successfully prosecuted precisely because of their 
unpopularity and the dislike the people felt for them. In contrast, Chihana’s 
statement reflected the popular will in Malawi. So much that if Chihana was 
guilty of sedition, then so were most people and, without a doubt, many, if 
not most, government officials.  
CONCLUSION 
The task of drawing the difference between seditious libel and lawful 
criticism is a dilemma facing any State. The clear dilemma as Fredrick 
Lawrence puts it is “how can we limit speech based solely on some 
evaluation of its consequences, yet how can we fail to take consequences 
into account.”91 For countries in transition or war, the distinction between 
lawful criticism and unlawful incitement can easily be imprecise. Therefore, 
America sentenced politically impotent Communists to long prison terms. 
Given the time when the sentences were imposed, the rulings that brought 
about these convictions were apparently rational and supported by popular 
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sentiment. Western countries have definitely progressed since what used to 
be considered as a clear matter of seditious libel in both England and 
America is presently generally regarded as merely the fervent speech which 
is constitutionally protected.92 Justice Holmes’s popular ‘clear and present 
danger’ test was severely criticized and by the 1960s the United States 
Supreme Court had taken measures to impose stringent and more 
demanding test for sedition.93  
Yates was a landmark decision in the American law of sedition. It 
required proof that defendants intended specific violent action aimed at the 
overthrow of the United States government. The Yates Court stated that 
advocacy of unlawful acts is protected by the First Amendment. However, it 
is worth noting that Yates was decided in a very different political context to 
Dennis. When Yates was decided, Stalin was deceased and criticized by his 
successor Nikita Khruschev. Dennis which was influenced by the ‘clear and 
present danger’ test was never over-ruled by the Supreme Court in Yates, 
but was distinguished by it. After Yates was decided, the Supreme Court 
rarely upheld convictions under the Smith Act. For example in Noto v. 
                                                 
92 See, Barendt, supra note 5 at 152. In America, the distinction between lawful 
criticism and seditious begun to develop in the late 1950s, where the Court 
took a more protective position on the right to speak on political matters. The 
Court shifted its focus on the ‘immediacy of lawless action.’ See, Brandenburg, 
infra. Similarly, in the United Kingdom freedom of political speech became more 
secure in the 1880s. See, R v. Burns, 16 Cox CC 335 (1886); R v. Aldred, 22 Cox 
CC 1 (1909) Like in the United States, the attention focused on the effects of 
words instead of the words themselves. The test for sedition in the United 
Kingdom is whether words will be likely to incite the audience addresses. The 
key is R v. Arrowsmith QB 678 (1975), where the defendant distributed 
literature at an army centre advocating soldiers not to serve in Northern 
Ireland. The court observed that “what it is concerned with is the likely effects 
on young soldiers aged 18, 19 or 20, some of whom may be immature 
emotionally and of limited political understanding.” Arrowsmith was convicted 
after it was found that the literature was “mischievous,” “wicked” and 
comprised the “clearest incitement to mutiny and desertion.” Her conviction 
was upheld by the European Commission on Human Rights (7050/75) after 
considering the possible result of mutiny and desertion if Arrowsmith’s 
campaign were not halted.  
93 See, Bond, 385 US 116 (1966); Watts v. United  States, 394 US 705 
(1969)(reversing the conviction of an individual on First Amendment grounds) 
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United States,94the Court reversed a conviction under the Smith Act. As 
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky argues: “perhaps the major difference between 
the recent and earlier cases as Schenck, Whitney, Gitlow and Dennis is the 
social climate the prior cases were all issued in intense times where there 
were strong pressures to suppress speech.”95  
The reality is that regardless of how an unreasonable prosecution 
such as Dennis seems to men and women in the 21st century, they seemed 
reasonable to the population at that time. Only in the unfortunate event 
that such times occur again will it be likely to know if the Brandenburg test 
will succeed in protecting opposition in times of conflict.  
Freedom of expression is regularly restricted during wartime.96 The 
clear lesson for Malawi is that, as long as the political leadership feel 
politically threatened within and without the political structures, including 
international pressures, the restriction on political speech will be rendered 
more probable.97 This restriction is, in part, the reaction to this fear. For 
instance, in the early 1990s, there were widespread calls for democratic 
change across the African continent. Most governments were forced to react 
to this pressure by calling for a referendum in the case of Malawi or direct 
election in the cases of Zambia, Lesotho, Kenya, South Africa, and Cape 
Verde and Sao Tome.98 This democratic movement also had a chilling effect 
                                                 
94367 U.S. 290 (1961) 
95 Chemerinsky, supra note 7 at pp. 991 
96 See, Koremastu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)(where the internment 
which was authorized by the President, advocated by the War Department, 
ratified by Congress, defended by the Justice Department, and approved by the 
Supreme Court, destroyed the right to peacefully assemble, the right of free 
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97 See, for example international pressure from the United States Government 
culminated into a senate resolution, “Expressing the Sense of the Senate 
Regarding the Government of Malawi's Arrest of Opponents and Suppression of 
Freedoms, and Conditioning Assistance for Malawi,” S.J. Res. 74, 103rd Cong. 
1st Sess. (1993) 
98 ‘In each of these cases, the changes in the global system evidently influenced 
the willingness of the incumbent ruler to depart. Of instance, in Malawi Dr 
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on the right of freedom of expression. In Malawi, there were widespread 
arrests of people like Chihana, Reverend Aaron Longwe and others on 
charges of sedition. In Kenya, Paul Muite and other opposition members of 
parliament were also arrested many of whom were charged with sedition. 99
           As has been demonstrated, Malawi’s sedition laws are extremely 
broad and its broad provisions are strictly construed against free speech. 
The courts are free to interpret what constitutes seditious intent. As a 
result, the court swept Chihana’s harmless political speech into the 
seditious libel group. Despite the progress in the legal reform and the 
adoption of a democratic constitution, there is a pre-existing rationalization 
for penalizing speech against the President and his government.100 Since the 
decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Ceylan v. Spain and 
subsequent others may be regarded as persuasive authority in Malawi, the 
relevant provisions of the European Convention at issue in that case are 
mirrored by similar provisions in the current Constitution of Malawi,101 and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hasting Banda was induced by international pressure to hold a referendum on 
whether there should be a multiparty system, and the subsequent elections, 
and finally depart when these were won by one of the opposition candidates.  
See, C. Clapham, Africa and International System, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press (1996), pp. 202, citing C. Baylies and M. Szeftel, The Fall and 
Rise of Multi-Party Politics in Zambia, Review of African Political Economy 
(1992), pp. 75-91. 
99 See, Kenya Human Rights Practice, U.S. Department of State 1995. 
100 For example, less than one year into his Presidency, President Bingu Wa 
Mutharika ordered the arrest of several journalist after they published a story 
that alleged the presence of spirits or ghosts at the State House in the Capital 
City of Lilongwe that motivated the President’s move to another residence. The 
Journalists were charged with ‘publishing false news likely to cause public 
alarm and fear.’ Available at www.bbc.co.uk/world/africa. (accessed on 14 
March 2005); See also, “Malawi’s Former Water Minister Arrested” (reporting 
that on 14 September, 2005 Gwanda Chakuamba was arrested and charged 
under the Protected Flags, Emblems Names Act for allegedly using insulting 
words against the President of Malawi) Available at www.irinnews.org (accessed 
on 11 November, 2005).  
101 Sections 34, 35, and 36 of the Malawi Constitution may be compared to 
section 10 (1) of the European Convention. Also relevant are the similar 
provisions in section 44 and article 10(2) relating to limitations on rights in 
Malawi and Europe, respectively. 
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coupled with the famous words of Justice Tambala in the case of the 
National Consultative Council v. The Attorney General102, that 
           
 “There is a need to strike a balance between the needs of 
society as a whole and those of individuals.  If the needs of 
society in term of peace, law and order, and national 
security, are stressed at the expense of the rights and 
freedoms of the individual, then the Bill of Rights contained 
in our Constitution will be meaningless and the people of 
this country will have struggled for freedom and democracy 
in vain.  In a democratic society, matters of national security 
should not be used as an excuse for frustrating the will of 
the people expressed in their Constitution.”103  
 
 One may, therefore, predict with some confidence that absent violence or 
force a political statement critical of the president or government of Malawi 
would probably receive more protection under current Constitutional Act of 
1994, which contains a justiciable Bill of Rights.104
         In the case of Lesotho and the future application of sedition laws, for 
example, the Manyau Court rejected the requirement of an element of 
violence on the grounds that “it overlooks the nature of present day modern 
society in general and the functioning of the State.”105 According to the 
                                                 
102Civil Cause No. 958 of 1994 (unreported), See, also quoted in Malawi Law 
Society and Others v. President and Others, (2002) AHRLR 110 (MwHC 2002). 
103 Id. 
104 The Chakuamba case mentioned in note 100 will probably serve as the test 
to the scope of the protections on speech under the 1994 Constitution. It was 
recently reported that Chambuaka’s case was referred to a Constitutional Court 
to decide the constitutionality of the Protected Flags, Emblems Names Act. A 
decision is expected sometime in the year 2006. See, 
www.dailytimes.bppmw.com (accessed on 19 December 2005). And another 
recent case involving defendants Mr. Abubakar Mbaya and McDonald Symon 
both belonging to the former ruling party was referred to the Constitutional 
Court in February 2006. The defendants were both charged with, among other 
things, sedition under section 50 of the Code. These cases in addition to the 
already mentioned Chakuamba case, will serve as test cases on the limits on 
speech permitted under the current Constitution. See, I. Masingati, “Mbaya 
Case Referred to Constitutional Court” available at www.nationmalawi.com 
(accessed on 6 March 2006) 
105 Manyau, supra note 80 at par. 17. 
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Court, “a modern State may be subverted by stratagems which involve no 
violence,” such as by way of “hacking into computer systems or interference 
with telecommunications.” 106However, the Court was sensitive to the 
concern of what it called the “feudal sweep of the common law offence” and 
reasoned that the “the common law may have to be addressed in a way 
which holds in balance the existence of sedition as a separate modern-day 
offence with its compliance with the Constitution and the fundamental 
rights the latter entrenches.”107  For instance, it suggested that ‘the actus 
reus of sedition, in the case of an unlawful public gathering, should relate to 
[the subversion or defiance] in the functioning of the State; and the mens 
rea should convey an intention on the part of an accomplice to subvert or 
defy the State.’108 Accordingly, this suggested definition would, arguably, 
offer some balance between legitimate forms of expression and permissible 
restrictions on speech.109
          On the other hand, there is a problem with this definition and that 
is it fails to take into account the requirement of violence by simply and 
correctly indicating that certain acts make it impossible to apply this 
element of violence. While the court’s imagination in this regard is 
realistic, Hoctor, however, correctly points that these modern acts can 
best be addressed by measures other than sedition. This would allow for 
courts to retain the element of violence in the crime of sedition, which is 
important because it renders a better balance between legitimate forms 
of expression and restrictions thereof. Perhaps, the fact that the element 
of violence is not effectively applicable to acts imagined by the Manyau 
Court, such as hacking into computers, is an indication that maybe we 
ought to address these and other similar acts by measures such as in 
                                                 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at par. 20. 
108 Id. 
109 For a critical review of this proposed definition see Hoctor, 18 SACJ (2005), 
pp. 347-350 (arguing that the proposed definition may actually be broader in 
scope than the current definition)  
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Malawi the Preservation of Public Security Act and in South Africa the 
Internal Security Act.110  
  The Manyau Court was right to emphasize that the crime of 
sedition should have to comply with Constitutional demands such as 
those on freedom of expression and assembly. Permitting an element of 
violence to be present in the crime of sedition, would effectively serve as a 
proper balance between these constitutional demands and the limits on 
them. It would allow free speech even that which seeks to defy the State 
or cause public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest in a non-violence 
manner.  
  In hindsight, it is unconvincing to suggest that since certain acts, 
in view of modern technology, may not be susceptible to the application 
of the requirement of violence; this element should be rejected, 
particularly where we have alternative means of addressing responsibility 
in such acts. Thus, the new definition, if it takes regards the demands of 
a free and democratic society should include the element of incitement of 
violence. Perhaps, an ideal definition of sedition should require that ‘the 
actus reus of sedition relate to a gathering of persons the unlawful 
purpose of which is to subvert or defy the functioning of the State by 
force or violence; and its mens rea to relate to an intention on the part of 
a participant so to subvert or defy the State by force or violence.’  
          What is more is that reform of the sedition law in Malawi should 
go beyond changing the law itself. A reasonable piece of legislation can be 
manipulated to fit the political needs of the day. Justice Holmes’s ‘clear 
and present danger test’ as stringent as it was protected only ‘puny 
anonymities.’111 Some commentators have even criticized that ‘the test 
extended safety only to the incredible fatuities of the lunatic fringe but 
                                                 
110 See, Hoctor, supra note 113 at 349. (suggesting that it is possible to 
establish liability for the acts imagined by the Manyau Court under the crime of 
sabotage spelled out in section 54 (3) of the internal Security Act of 1982) 
111 Abrams, supra note 27 
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not to the more useful opinionated speakers.’112It is the speaker’s 
eagerness for the result which discriminates abstract from incitement to 
action. The problem of course is determining when speech is advocacy of 
doctrine or advocacy of action. In many instances, this is likely to be a 
distinction based entirely on how a judge chooses to characterize the 
speech. As Holmes pointed out “every idea is an incitement.”113  
  What should be remembered is that freedom of speech is as 
important to a democratic society as is oxygen to fundamental human 
development. The current Constitution, which came into effect in 1994 
two years after Chihana was decided, provides in sections 34, 35 and 36, 
respectively that: 
  
34. “Every person shall have the right to freedom of opinion, 
including  the right to hold opinions without interference to 
hold receive and impart opinions. 
                                                                                                                               
35. Every person shall have the right to freedom of 
expression.  
     
36. The press shall have the right to report and publish 
freely, within Malawi and abroad, and to be accorded the 
fullest possible facilities for access to public information.”114
 
Like many constitutions, including that of South Africa in section 36, the 
Malawi Constitution has a broad limitations clause in section 12(v) and 
44 (2) and (3) providing, in pertinent part, that: 
 
12. As all persons have equal status before the law, the only 
justifiable limitations to lawful rights are those necessary to 
ensure peaceful human interaction in an open and 
democratic society. 
                                                 
112 D. Richards, Free Speech as Toleration in WJ Waluchow (ed), Free 
Expression: essays in law and philosophy, Oxford, Clarendon Press, (1994). 
113 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) 
114 Malawi Constitutional Act of 1994. 
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(2) [No] restrictions or limitations may be placed on the 
exercise of any rights and freedoms provided for in this 
Constitution other than those prescribed by law, which are 
reasonable, recognized by international human rights 
standards and necessary in an open and democratic society.  
(3) Laws prescribing restrictions or limitations shall not 
negate the essential content of the right or freedom in 
question shall be of general application.  
The Malawi Supreme Court of Appeals has yet to be presented with a 
case to decide the meaning of these broad constitutional provisions in 
the context of the Seditions Act and the Protected Flags, Names and 
Emblems Act (which overlaps, in its application, with some provisions of 
the sedition legislation).115  However, in Malawi Law Society and Others 
v. President and Others,116 the High Court in Blantyre, recently 
invalidated two directives made by the President on the grounds that 
they violated constitutional rights to freedom of association, assembly 
and demonstration, expression, conscious and opinion as enshrined in 
sections 32, 33, 34, 35, 38 of the Constitution, in that order.   
  The background to the case is that sometime in the early months 
of the year 2002, they were rumours circulating that the Muluzi 
administration had plans to submit a bill to parliament which would 
seek to amend section 83(3) of the Constitution. This section provides 
that “the President, the Vice-President and the Second Vice President 
may serve in their respective capacities a maximum of two consecutive 
terms.” This sparked a debate amongst all Malawians, which culminated 
into peaceful demonstrations across the country some for and some 
against the proposed amendments. Amidst these demonstrations, the 
President held a rally on 28 May 2002 where he directed that there 
                                                 
115 See comments in notes 104 and 108, above. In this regard, Danwood Chirwa 
has strongly advocated for constitutional litigation to expound the meaning of 
the provisions in the current Constitution of Malawi. See, D.M. Chirwa, A Full 
Loaf is Better than Half: The Constitutional Protection of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in Malawi, Journal of African Law 49, 2 (2005), pp 241. 
116 (2002) AHRLR 110 (MwHC 2002). 
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should be no demonstrations for or against the imagined constitutional 
amendment concerning presidential term limits and directed the 
Inspector General of Police and Army Commander to deal with anyone 
who disobeyed his directive.117                                     
  In deciding the constitutionality of the two directives, Judge Twea 
explained that  the banning of ‘all forms of demonstrations” was 
unreasonable as such a ban is too wide and not capable of enforcement 
as events had shown in some cities across the country.118 He further 
explained that the organizers of the demonstrations on this issue, or 
indeed any other issue, for or against must bear in mind public 
tranquillity. This language in the opinion suggests that as long as public 
demonstrations (political speech as such) are peaceful and consistent 
with administrative requirements (such as time, place and manner), the 
government cannot not limit them. The court also criticized the police 
that they “have at times acted in a biased manner,”119 and reiterated the 
call by Justice Tambala that “matters of national security should not be 
used as an excuse to frustrate the will of the people expressed in their 
Constitution.”120 It is against this background that leads one to assume 
that perhaps the Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal may adhere to this 
standard and adopt a stronger position against government restrictions 
on the freedom of expression and other rights enshrined in the 
Constitution, particularly in context of sedition laws by requiring some 
element of violence before a speech can be restricted.    
  Inevitably, the courts must make value choices as to what speech 
is protected by the relevant provisions of the Constitution, under what 
circumstances, and when and how the government may regulate speech 
as demonstrated by the decision in Malawi law Society and Others v. the 




120 Id, quoting, Justice Tambala in National Consultative Council v. The Attorney 
General, supra note 103 (see full quote infra). 
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President and Others. This type of analysis is achievable in reference to 
the goals that freedom of speech is intended to accomplish. It has 
historically been accepted that freedom of speech should be protected as 
a fundamental right.121 Freedom of speech is the bedrock of any 
democratic society because it ensures the open discussion of candidates 
which is essential for the electorate to make informed decisions in 
elections. The fundamentality of political speech allows people to 
influence their government’s choice of policies.122 In this sense, political 
speech is a political duty of every citizen to ensure their participation in 
public affairs and self-determination. Self-determination can only subsist 
in so far as the ‘electorate acquires the wisdom, worthiness, integrity, 
understanding, and liberal admiration to the general welfare that, in 
theory, casting a ballot is understood to express.’123     
  The advancement of American and European law helps us to 
understand why the development of freedom of speech in Malawi still 
faces a long meandering and complicated road. Political stability and a 
secure international environment are primary to a tolerant culture in 
which freedom of speech can thrive.124 Freedom of speech does not solely 
                                                 
121 Whitney, supra note 37 at 375-377 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (Justice 
Brandeis offered an eloquent explanation for why freedom of speech is 
protected) 
122 See for example, in 2002, the people of Malawi through public 
demonstrations and other exercise of their freedom of speech were able to 
influence their government choice not to amend section 83(3) of the 
Constitution that if passed  would have allowed the President to run for a term 
of office. In upholding the peoples right to expression and demonstrate, a 
constitutional court rightly prohibited the government from banning the 
demonstrations and other forms of expressions. See, Malawi Law Society, supra 
note 116. 
123 A. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, Sup Ct Rev (1961), pp. 
245, 255. 
124 M. Redish, “Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In 
Defense of Clear and Present Danger,” 70 Cal L Rev (1982), pp. 1159; H. 
Josephs, “The Chinese Democracy Movement in the United States Perspective,” 
10 UCLA. Pacific Basin LJ (1992), pp. 285. 
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relate to protection of peoples right to speak in society.125 Internal 
circumstances in Malawi will be the most important measures of a 
tolerant society. Tolerance is a desirable value because it serves as a 
model that encourages more tolerance across society. From a criminal 
law stand point, one prosecutor has remarked that ‘the rise in murder 
cases is partly attributable to this lack of tolerance in the Malawi society.’ 
It is, thus, indispensable to convince the political leadership in Malawi 
that national security and public order are not compromised by 
permitting lawful opposition and criticism even against the person of the 
President. They need to recognize that permitting such opposition or 
criticism creates legitimacy of a government. Only then can one 
appreciate what Dunduzu Chisiza rightly proclaimed, in regards to the 
post-independent African State, when he wrote that:             
“[Political] unrest results from the conviction of opposition 
parties that the speeches of their parliamentary 
representatives, in and outside parliament, will not influence 
governing parties to change some of their policies, once they 
begin to feel that way, they are often certain to despise and 
to denounce their opponents as vain and selfish. Their 
opponents will regard this as mischievous detraction and 
retort by calling them jealous, visionless. And so the stage is 
set for full-scale mudslinging which sometimes culminates in 
the governing party clamping down on their opponents with 
the force of law”126
 
 What continually exists between the government and its opposition is 
misconstruction. Misconstruction leads to fear, fear makes anyone want to 
survive, which in turn leads to political suppression and dreadful policies. 
Discourse and debate, rather than exchange of allegations and insults are 
the imperative starting points. However, this demands concession, 
                                                 
125 L. Bolinger, The Tolerant Society: Freedom of Speech and Extremist Speech in 
America, Oxford, Oxford University Press (1986) 
126 D. Chisiza, African What Lies Ahead, 2nd ed, New Delhi, Indian Council for 
Africa (1967), pp. 2. 
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moderation and logic on all sides of the table because discussion is a way of 
combining information and enlarging the range of arguments. At a 
minimum this is what should occur in a true democracy. Political criticism 
should be met with counterarguments and political opponents should 
always feel free to persuade the electorate that they would do a superior 
task of governing than the current leadership. In such a debate the best 
ideas will ultimately prevail. It is a proven social fact that disagreements, 
when their causes are intelligible, can enrich and strengthen, rather than 
injure, our sense of objectivity.  
This article suggest that instead of decriminalizing sedition, Malawi 
should consider adopting a rigorous and more demanding test for sedition 
in line with some of the requirements that have been suggested above in 
favour of more free speech. It is further suggested that a more optimistic 
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